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 Ethiopia has deep linguistic and religious diversities. Because of lack 
of accommodation of these diversities the country was plagued by internal 
conflicts and civil wars. True, power sharing is very essential to any 
accommodation of deep diversities. The goal of this paper is evaluate the 
system of power-sharing in Ethiopia in light of the Arend Lijphart’s theory 
of power sharing. It identifies power-sharing as the most fundamental 
conflict management strategy adopted to deal with diversities. The article 
argues that the Ethiopia’s power-sharing model, which is largely 
consociational, is less suitable to Ethiopia as compared to more centripetal 
model of power-sharing.  
 




 Ethiopia is deeply divided country with several languages, cultures 
and religions. Some of these ethno-linguistic groups live in a contiguous 
territory. In the past, highly centrist authoritarian regimes pursued 
assimilations policies to deal with these diversities (Clapaham, 1988). 
However, since 1991 the new government adopted powers-haring and 
accommodation of deep diversities as a strategy to manage diversity. In 1995 
when the new constitution was drafted, Ethiopia started with a bold 
experiment. This bold experiment was recognition, an insistence that the 
country is not going to see its diversity as a problem. Rather it is going to 
foreground its diversity. 
 The prevailing wisdom at that time in Africa in general and Ethiopia 
in particular was that diversities should not be emphasized because it will 
make the state unstable. The decision to forge unity in diversity was actually 
the cumulative wisdom of the Ethiopian left since 1960s. The ruling EPRDF 
as heir to Ethiopian Student Movement, has long decided that Ethiopia can 
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only hold if it foregrounds its deep diversities.  This was why the 
Transitional Government (1991-1995) which was dominated by EPRDF took 
bold measures towards decentralization and self-determination for Ethiopia’s 
ethnic groups. So by the time the 1995 constitution was drafted the most 
fundamental decisions about Ethiopia’s diversities have already been a 
settled affair. There was an almost consensus among the members of the 
constitutive assembly that Ethiopia can only be united in diversity. The 
minority opinion, however, was that the federal system should be territorial, 
and should not be ethnic-based. In a sense, this at that time was a very risky 
venture.  
 This article is organised in to three parts. Following this introductory 
section is the second section that reflects on the different models of power-
sharing. The third part examines the power-sharing arrangement in Ethiopia. 
The paper ends with fourth section with a conclusion.  
 
Power-sharing arrangements  
 This part will briefly discuss the major models of power sharing 
arrangements. Power-sharing can simply defined as the act of providing 
‘every significant identity group or segement in a society representation and 
decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over 
issues of importance to the group’ (Sisk, 1996:5). There are different types of 
power-sharing arrangements depending on the conditions of each country.  
 One of these models is consociationalism. The most popular 
expression “consociational democracy” was developed by Lijphart. 
Consociational theory purports that stability can be reached in divided 
societies through the adoption, development and institutionalization of a 
power-sharing model which aims at taming and restructuring intrinsic fault 
lines. consociationalism is directly linked to elite behavior and to what 
Lijphart calls ‘the self-negating prophecy’. Aware of underlying centrifugal 
threats, political elites can purposefully create channels of cooperation and 
manage destabilizing structures that threaten to fling the system into unruly 
waters. In other words, elites develop and internalize conflict-regulating 
strategies so as to counteract the dangers of division. 
 Consociationalism in particular aims at achieving stability in divided 
societies through the adoption and institutionalisation of power-sharing 
models by taming and restructuring intrinsic fault lines. Consociationalism is 
directly linked to elite behaviour. Aware of the underlying centrifugal 
threats, political elites can purposefully create channels of communication. 
They develop and internalise conflict-regulating strategies so as to counteract 
the dangers of division (Ibid). 
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 For consociational democracy to succeed, Lijphart outlined four 
prerequisites based on elite active behaviour and accommodation: Leaders 
should be aware of the dangers waiting beneath the system, they should 
commit to preserving the system, they should able to surpass segmental 
cleavages at the top, and they should be able to work out appropriate 
solutions to various communal problems. 
 Consociationalism has four elements (Lijphart, 1977: 16):  
1. Grand executive coalition representing different societal segments: 
elites come together in the interests of the whole society. 
2. Mutual veto: which allows groups to reject decisions detrimental to 
their interests 
3. Proportionality: proportionality rules as a governing principle in 
political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of 
public funds.  
4. Segmented autonomy: segmented autonomy in education, linguistic, 
cultural and legal affairs. 
 In his recent writings, Lijphart considers grand coalition and 
segmental autonomy as the two core components of consociational 
democracy, and argues that proportionality and mutual veto act as 
complementary characteristics which improve the quality of power-sharing 
and enhance inter-communal cooperation and cultural autonomy. 
 Such system complements the other power sharing tool is, i.e., 
federalism. Federalism as a system of government combining self-rule and 
shared rule at federal level is an effective mechanism for a shred political 
life. In such situations federalism is complemented by other tools of power 
sharing, such as (Lijphart, 1977: 25): 
1. Electoral systems: proportional representation systems that represent 
also smaller minorities. 
2. Party systems: ethnic congress party. 
3. Executive: grand coalition all ethnic groups and the head of 
government adhering to all ethnic groups. 
4. Second chambers: protecting minorities by giving over representation 
in law-making process. 
5. Public administration: proportional representation of all different 
ethnic groups/professional bureaucracy with no special safeguards. 
 However, cosociational model has been severely criticized for 
various theoretical and empirical reasons. The most damaging criticism 
revolves around Lijphart’s ‘self-negating prophecy’. It is generally argued 
that the enlightened role of the elite is amplified beyond bounds. The model 
has also been criticized for its lessened democratic element, as the mode; is 
built on elite supremacy and predominance over the followers. Another 
reservation is that the adoption of power-sharing devices may exacerbate 
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inter-segmental conflicts and tensions instead of pacifying them, as observed 
in deeply divided Iraqi society in which the enforcement of federal structures 
without an efficient and parallel approach to conflict-regulation has 
exacerbated inter-religious animosities. Moreover, the claim that elites are 
always enlightened and that they act in the best interest of their society is 
controversial.  
 The other model of power sharing is the incentivist 
model/centripetalism. This model is based on the criticism that 
consociationalism failed to highlight the incentives for elite cooperation and 
inter-group accommodation. Even if the elites commit themselves to 
consociational model, in competitive political environment, centrifugal 
forces coming from their followers and political opponents may easily 
undermine the durability of the agreement (Donald Horwotiz, 1985). Then 
what is needed is to create incentives for sustained elite cooperation and 
inter-group accommodation. This can be done by modifications in federal 
system (creation of ethnically heterogeneous states –this will lead to 
interethnic relations that can ease hostilities at the national level; or give 
minorities at the federal level one state to become majority in one of the 
states, thereby compensating for their marginal influence; or proliferation of 
states to reduce parochial alignments and issues) and reforms in the electoral 
systems (Horowitz, 1999: 139-141). 
 According to centripetal model, instated of organising elite power, 
this approach aims to promote cooperation between the different groups in 
using an electoral system that encourages political representatives to find 
support outside of their won ethnic communities. Example, they can use 
multiple proportional vote system; this system, although maintains the 
consociational goal of reflecting the different communities in parliament, it 
strengthens centripetal trends in allowing elections of every group to cast 
their preferences for candidates of different communities. While seat 
pooling, as in consociationalism, entails the formation of post-election 
coalitions to secure legislative majority without giving such a coalition 
support in the electorate, vote pooling works at the lower level and favours 
centripetal tendencies against ethnic extremism. The centripetal approach 
aims to encourage moderation on ethnic issues, and thereby favours more 
ideological cleavages (Horowtiz, 1985: 628).  
Ethiopian model of dealing with diversities 
 The Ethiopian model of dealing with deep diversities has a number of 
elements: the first is the constitutional protection of diversities. The right of 
self-determination is recognized. The right includes self-rule, linguistic and 
cultural rights, the right for fair representation and finally as a sovereign 
right to secede if they wish so. The second is a constitutional package for 
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power-sharing arrangements. Thirdly, there is an affirmation of official 
multilingualism. Previous governments adopted Amharic language as the 
only legitimate language to be used in all official functions. In contrast, the 
current government developed constitution and other laws which focus on 
the rights of nations and nationalities. The government follows what is called 
promotive language policy, as there is a promotion of several languages by 
giving some constitutional, administrative and legal guarantees. Among the 
models of language policy, it is clear that Ethiopia adopted an official 
multilingualism as a model of language policy, as there is recognition for all 
the languages spoken in the country. The constitution states that each nation, 
nationality and people has the right to preserve and guard its identity, 
develop its culture and history and use its own language. The Federal 
constitution makes Amharic working language of the Federal government, 
regional states may determine their respective languages (Article 5). Today, 
in addition to this, there are also many languages used as official languages 
at zonal and wereda levels. The Education and Training Policy (1994) 
provides that primary education should be given in nationality languages. 
 Finally, along with the above constitutional guarantees was a package 
of cultural policy, which is consciously non-assimilationist. The key symbols 
of state, from national anthem to everything reflect that the cultural policy 
foregrounds the country’s diversities. The national anthem begins by talking 
about not Ethiopia but of the different units that constitutes Ethiopia. This is 
a way of saying that Ethiopia exists because of you. 
The cultural policy of Ethiopia states that the policy ensures 
1.[all] the languages,…, literature … of the nations, nationalities, 
and peoples of Ethiopia receive equal recognition, respect and 
chance to development. 
2.creating a favorable situation to carry out scientific research and 
inventory of the languages , oral literature. …of the nations, 
nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia and make them useful in 
development endeavour 
3.providing the necessary professional assistance to the various 
nations, nationalities and peoples while making their choice of 
language (The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture 2003) 
The final and major focus of this paper is system of power-sharing. 
 
Power-sharing in Ethiopian 
 In Ethiopia, successive governments in the past tried to impose unity 
by force, but failed. As Okafore (2000:525) makes clear, ‘violent, coercive 
unification and repressive homogenisation are morally and socially 
bankrupt.’  Ethiopia had faced large scale ethnic violence and conflict, due to 
highly centralised system of governance that marginalized their marginalised 
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the socio-economic and cultural rights of the diverse ethnic groups within the 
country (Gebru Tareke, 1991:15).  
 Power sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa as paths 
out of civil war (Adejumobi, 2007: 37).  As mentioned before, 
consociationalism claims that, all other things being equal, we would expect 
power-sharing regimes to be more stable, with greater participation and 
inclusiveness, more effective government, and a better record of democratic 
consolidation.  Such system is most suitable for transitional and 
consolidating democracies struggling to achieve legitimacy and stability in 
plural societies. Both consociationalism and federalism expand the 
opportunities for ethnic groups to achieve elected office, a voice within 
government, and a stake in the political system (Ibid).  
 The process of power-sharing in Ethiopia corresponds to most of the 
elements of consociational and incentivist models of power-sharing 
(Horowitz 2002:23, 1991; and Lijphart 1977:16-25). The Ethiopian federal 
arrangement could be described as federal consociational one. The adoption 
of the federal system of government was meant to provide a proper balance 
between at least major ethnic groups, thereby holding a country united which 
was threatened by disintegrative forces. It is stated that the two major 
objectives of the Ethiopian federation are:  To maintain the imposed unity 
through the constitutional recognition of diversities and to promote 
democracy by guaranteeing both individual and group rights. In short, it 
aimed at forging unity out of diversity (FDRE Constitution, Art 39 and 47). 
 The basic structure of power-sharing in Ethiopia covers three major 
dimensions – the territorial, fiscal and political. Federalism and the creation 
of states relates with the territorial dimension of power-sharing, while the 
fiscal dimension has to do with the revenue allocation system. Finally, the 
political dimension of power-sharing deals with the method of office 
distribution. The same dimensions of power-sharing are applied at the state 
level, especially in ethnically heterogeneous ones.  
 A parliamentary form of government is instituted at both federal and 
state levels. Apparently, this form of government was selected because there 
was a desire to make power a sharable good, which the presidential system 
does not. Sharing of power is essential to any accommodation of deep 
diversities. Therefore, parliamentary form of government which is coalition 
requiring and coalition sustaining was consciously selected to make sure that 
political power and resources are shared among the diverse nations and 
nationalities of Ethiopia.  
 The constitution gives the right every ethno-cultural community to 
create its own regional state, or when to have a governmental structure below 
regional governments. Accordingly, there are nine regional states and many 
special zones, districts, and neighbourhood associations, created to grant 
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special administrative status to minority ethno-cultural communities.  
Creation of representative regional and local governments facilitates sharing 
of territorial powers. The two forms of states creation prescribed by both the 
consociational and incentivist models can be identified in Ethiopia. 
Ethnically homogeneous states are created for geographically and 
demographically large ethnic groups like Oromo and Amhara. Ethnically 
heterogeneous states are also created to hold together several minority 
groups.  
 On the fiscal dimension, the revenue allocation system guides the 
process of allocation of financial resources. Revenue allocation process 
shows a desire to balance population size and fiscal need among the regions. 
Vertically, there is fiscal centralization, while revenue allocation is based on 
the principle of equality of states at horizontal level.  
 The political dimension of power-sharing is defined by office 
distribution at federal level. There is a system of fair and appropriate 
representation of ethnic communities at the federal level, commensurate with 
their relative numerical size. This representation is mostly evident in both 
houses of the federal parliament, the federal executive and judicial bodies 
(Article 39(3)). There is an informal arrangement in which each state of 
Ethiopia considered in the selection and recruitment into federal 
bureaucracy. These processes correspond to onsociationalism’s elite 
coalition and proportional representation. However, in Ethiopia coalition 
within the ruling party is conditional upon subscribing to the ruling party’s 
membership and its ideology. So, political parties that do not subscribe to the 
ruling ideology of the ruling party could not share power. When it comes to 
minority veto, the Ethiopian model of power-sharing betrays the principle of 
consociationalism. Federal policymaking process is didn’t provide for 
minority veto. In the Ethiopian federation, however, the right of secession is 
guaranteed as a right of minority veto.  
Party level collation building  
 Unlike almost all African countries (Adejumobi, 2007:32), there is no 
ban on ethnic parties in Ethiopia. In line with the argument of 
consociationalism, ethnic parties help diminish conflicts by channelling 
demands through legal channels. Of course, political parties that cross-cut 
cleavages and facilitate consensus, as is the case in Switzerland, are more 
suitable for national integration. But given Ethiopia’s peculiar conditions, 
rather than catch-all parties ethnic congress parties are more appropriate.  
 The federal system has created institutional space that has 
encouraged the formation of ethnic parties, which compete mostly in local 
and regional elections. 
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 Organizationally, the ruling EPRDF is a front founded by the union 
of political organisations representing the four major regions/ethnic groups 
“on the basis of equality”. All major party structures such as the congress, 
and the executive committee comprises equal number of representatives of 
member organizations (EPRDF Political Programme, 1993). So, clearly the 
EPRDF could be considered as a congress party or federation of ethnic 
parties. The party allocates party posts and government offices with at least 
quasi-consociational formulas.  
 I argue that the centripetal model, not consociational, is more 
appropriate to Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian model of power-sharing, as it stands 
now, lacks the necessary incentives for sustained elite cooperation and inter-
group accommodation. Although there is no exact congruence between the 
territory of the states and the ethno-linguistic groups, there is attempt to grant 
a mother state to some of the dominant nationalities. This not only led to 
administratively inefficient structures but also reinforce the difference 
between the communities. In this case, there must be federal restructuring to 
make most states ethnically heterogonous. Besides,  there needs to be 
proliferation of states by, in some cases, restoring historic provinces and 
organize them along federal lines.  This will help for administrative 
convenience and most importantly, reduce parochial alignments. 
Furthermore, the current majoriterian electoral system and drawing of 
electoral constituencies needs to be reformed so as to create incentives for 
representatives to rely for votes outside of their ethnic communities. What is 
also lacking in Ethiopia is different approaches and strategies for the 
promotion of cross-party integration, example by using formation rules and 
electoral rules (Proclamation No. 33/2007), in line with the centripetalism.  
Conclusion 
 Arguably the Ethiopian system a consociational federal one, or at 
least that is what it wants to achieve.  However, the system as it stands now 
faces few challenges.  First, due to organisation of territories based on sole 
criteria of ethnicity, individuals living in a regional state not ethnically 
related to them have no same political right with members of the ethnic 
community. Second, the dominant party system makes regional states less 
autonomous. Compounding the problem is that some parties are seen as 
instruments of the central government rather than representatives of 
respective ethnic communities. As O’Leary demonstrates what matters for 
democratic consolidation ‘is meaningful cross-community executive power 
sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government 
with at least plurality levels of support within its segment’ (O’Leary, 2005: 
13). 
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 The other problem is the lack of acceptance of the diverse nature of 
the country by some segments of the country. These groups are openly 
unsympathetic to the federal system, partly as a result of the lack of 
inclusiveness of the process of formation of the federal system. According to 
these groups, ethnic federalism would disintegrate the country (Bahru 
Zewde, 1991). This has been affecting national consensus and integration.  
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